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This thesis explores risk management techniques and the various methods that are available to aid 
in the determination of risk. It highlights both quantitative and qualitative risk management tools 
and focuses on Newfoundland and Labrador's local oil and gas industry. The concept of 
maintaining risk levels to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) throughout the lifecycle 
of a facility is a focal point of this thesis.  
 
Some of the more significant Major Accident Events (MAE) of the past are highlighted with a 
focus on the effects those MAEs have had on the local oil and gas industry. In particular, the 
actions leading up to and during the Piper Alpha disaster are reviewed.  Exploration of the 
aftermath of the Piper Alpha and the effects both it and the Ocean Ranger disaster have on the 
Canadian and Newfoundland regulatory regime are discussed.  
 
The permanent Newfoundland and Labrador offshore oil and gas assets/facilities are highlighted; 
The unique requirements some of these facilities are currently facing, as the assets age and 
transition into a period of extension of the original design life, are explored. With age, there are 
new hazards and differing risks to the overall facility. Aging mechanisms, as they pertain to safety 
systems, and the determination of service life, are explored.  
 
Since the late 1980s, the Canada-Newfoundland Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) 
regulates local offshore installations through a suite of regulations and guidelines. The current 
regulatory regime is somewhat prescriptive in that, for the large part, it dictates how an Operator 
is to achieve regulatory compliance. It is the intention that the regulatory framework is to transition 
from a prescriptive based regulatory regimen to a hybrid approach where goal-based regulations 
are preferred through the Frontier and Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative (FORRI). 
 
FORRI is a federal/provincial government partnership initiative focusing on regulations in all 
offshore administrative areas in Canada. FORRI intends to modernize the regulatory framework 
to performance-based requirements, reduce redundancy across multiple regulations, bring 
standards up to date, and enable a more efficient and effective regulatory regime. FORRI intends 
to eliminate five existing regulations and integrate them into one new framework regulation.   
 
The proposed policy intention for the Framework Regulations is reviewed against the current suite 
of C-NLOPB regulations. The more substantial differences concerning Technical Safety design 
are presented as a gap assessment.  The assessment is not intended to be an exhaustive listing; 
however, the aim is to highlight some of the more prudent changes potentially affecting the 
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1.1 History  
The offshore oil and gas industry has a deep-seated history locally, in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
First oil was discovered in 1979 after approximately 13 years of exploratory drilling on the Grand 
Banks in the Jeanne d'Arc Basin.  (Higgins, Oil Industry and the Economy, 2009). The 
Newfoundland and Labrador oil and gas history is one that has been marked with both great 
successes and devastating tragedies. The industry has grown, developed, and changed throughout 
the last 40 years with new discoveries, new facilities, and new regulatory regimes.  
 
As the industry grows and learns from the successes and failures of the past, the understood risk 
tolerance may also change. This thesis explores various risk management methods with a focus on 
the principle of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and how a risk tolerance level may 
change throughout the facility lifecycle. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Scope 
This thesis explores various risk management processes with a focus on the local oil and gas 
industry of Newfoundland and Labrador. It attempts to highlight the most influential major 
accident events (MAEs) of the past to understand the effect they have had on the current safety 
practices and the industry regulatory regime.  
 
It details the current local offshore production facilities to highlight the facility lifecycle, focusing 
on the aging facilities and the risks associated with Asset Life Extension (ALE).  
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A review of upcoming changes proposing regulatory renewal initiative, known as the Frontier 
Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative (FORRI), is undertaken to highlight some of the more 
significant changes concerning safety in design.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
There are several objectives of this thesis, all of which focus on the collection of data, review and 
critical analysis of that information and the summarization of findings into a useful technical work. 
 
The first objective is to research and document established theories and methods of risk 
management and present the most commonly used techniques in the oil and gas industry.  
 
The second intention is to collect information on past MAEs in the oil and gas industry and analyze 
the causation factors following the accident investigations. The thesis critically analyzes the Piper 
Alpha disaster and details lessons learned from the tragedy. It presents the linkages from past 
MAEs and the role the Piper Alpha disaster has played on strengthening the safety culture and 
regulatory regime in the oil and gas industry. 
 
The concept of ALARP is a focal point of this thesis and is critically analyzed throughout. A 
further objective of this thesis is to highlight the risk reduction measures/quantitative risk reviews 
that are mandated under the current local regulatory regime and typically employed during the 
design of an offshore facility to ensure risk levels are ALARP. Furthermore, this thesis aims to 
demonstrate that new hazards may develop, or existing hazards may be modified as a facility ages 
and associated risks must be reevaluated to ensure they remain ALARP.  
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The final objective of this thesis is to analyze the upcoming regulatory changes that will affect the 
local oil and gas industry as FORRI comes into force. The thesis highlights the most significant 
regulatory implications that may impact the technical safety design of an offshore facility through 
a regulatory gap analysis. The concept of ALARP will be further embedded into local regulatory 
regime with FORRI. 
 
1.4 Research Scope 
The scope of the current study is from the oil and gas perspective with emphasis on the local 
Newfoundland and Labrador offshore environment. While the research may be applicable to other 
hazardous activities and geographical areas, this has not been explored under this scope of work.  
This work focuses on the concept of ALARP and risks that are managed through the lifecycle of a 
facility.  
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of the following seven chapters: 
Chapter 1 provides background information, the objective and scope of the thesis, as well as the 
thesis structure. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to risk management principles pertaining to the offshore oil 
and gas industry. It includes definitions and information on various types of risk 
management/assessment tools available. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews major accident events of the past and how past tragedies shape the safety 
performance of the current industry. 
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Chapter 4 analyses the Piper Alpha disaster with respect to risk management. It explores the 
learning from the Cullen Report and how it has influenced the regulatory regime.  
 
Chapter 5 includes methods of risk evaluation/studies usually undertaken during the design of an 
offshore installation, including requirements of the C-NLOPB Installation regulations and the 
classification of safety critical elements. 
 
Chapter 6 reviews aging platforms/installations and the requirement for asset life extension. It 
discusses requirements for validating risk levels and changes to risk profiles with respect to 
ALARP and the precautionary principle. 
 
Chapter 7 highlights the current regulatory regime for local offshore installations and upcoming 
regulatory changes.  
  
5 
2 Safety and Risk Management  
2.1 General 
Safety and risk management are of paramount importance during the design, construction and the 
operational lifecycle of offshore installations. Particularly for offshore Newfoundland and 
Labrador, platforms are aging, and regulatory regimes are being updated.   
 
To effectively manage risk, a structured risk management system must be employed. With respect 
to the safety of offshore installations, risk management is founded upon the proper identification 
of existing and foreseeable major hazards.  
 
There are different aspects to process safety and risk management; however, they hinge on the 
identification of hazards to assessing the risk and then mitigating/managing the risk.   
 
Risk is simply a measure of the occurrence of a potential loss. With respect to process safety, risk 
is measured based on the likelihood of the hazardous event occurring and the consequence or 
impact of that event. (Modarres, 2006) Safety is the freedom from the unacceptable risk.  
 
A typical risk management procedure would include the following steps: 
 
Risk Assessment – Determining the magnitude of the risk and whether it requires treatment. This 
involves three sub-steps: 
 
Risk Identification – Identifying where, when, why, and how events could occur or 
circumstances could exist that could cause harm or loss. 
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Risk Analysis – Determining consequences, existing controls, and likelihood and hence 
the level of risk. This analysis should consider the range of potential consequences, 
including escalation, and how these could occur. 
 
Risk Evaluation – Comparing estimated levels of risk against the risk tolerance criteria, 
enabling decisions to be made about the extent and nature of risk mitigation required and 
associated priorities. 
 
Risk Treatment – Developing and implementing cost-effective strategies and action plans for 
mitigating risks. 
 
2.2 Risk Analysis and Evaluation  
Risk analysis is a means of establishing the event's potential losses/consequences and estimating 
the likelihood or frequency of such an event. There are various methods used to evaluate risk; 
however, all forms assess the hazards or threats that may lead to an undesired consequence. While 
practices vary based on the company or risk analyst, the worst credible consequences are typically 
considered. During a risk analysis, the full scope of consequences should be evaluated, and they 
are often prioritized in the following order: 
1. Injury to the public or workforce 
2. Damage to the environment 
3. Damage to assets and incurred cost 
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The event can have consequences in all three categories. In particular, where the asset damage and 
incurred cost consequences are greater than the health, safety, and environmental risk (HSE), the 
HSE risk should be considered separately. 
 
These risk assessment methods can be generally categorized into two broad categories: 
quantitative and qualitative.  However, it is important to note that in practice, many risk evaluation 
methods are a hybrid of both quantitative and qualitative methods.  
 
2.2.1 Quantitative 
Quantitative methods of risk evaluation are generally based on a statistical analysis of past 
hazardous events. Quantitative risk evaluation uses a mathematical scale to determine both the 
probability of an event occurring and the severity of the consequences.  
 
There are various quantitative methods in which risks may be presented; one of the most common 
is the Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA). For each hazardous event outcome, IRPA can be 
calculated as follows:  
 
IRPA =          Frequency of hazardous outcome event  
x  
Probability of fatalities  
x  
Proportion of year an individual is exposed to the hazard 
 
Equation 1: Individual Risk per Annum Formula 
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Alternatively, risks may be presented as group risk, which is the measure of the risk to society.  
The Health and Safety Executive defines group risk as "the relationship between frequency and 
the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm from the realization of specific 
hazards." Group risk is utilized when there is a concern of multiple individuals being affected 
simultaneously by an event.  Group risk is often expressed in terms of an F-N diagram. (Health 
and Safety Laboratory and the Health and Safety Executive , 2009) 
 
Figure 1: Typical F-N Curve (S.Tesfamariam, 2013) 
 
2.2.2 Qualitative 
Conversely, qualitative methods are customarily subjective risk assessments and are primarily 
based on the knowledge of those directly involved in the evaluation. Qualitative methods use a 
relative scale to determine the probability of an event occurring and the severity of the 
consequences.  
 
Risks associated with qualitative risk assessments are often presented by means of a risk matrix. 
(Khan, Rathnayaka, & Ahmed, 2015) A risk matrix is a two-dimensional presentation of the 
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likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequence. In practice, risk matrices vary from 
company to company based on risk tolerances. Typically, risk matrices range from 5x5 to 7x7 and 
at a minimum result in low, medium, and high risk.    
 
Figure 2: Generic Risk Matrix 
Initial risk ranking is generally recorded without controls and safeguards considered to establish 
the initial unmitigated risk.  
 
Risk treatment aids in the reduction of the likelihood of an event by adding safeguards and/or 
improving detection of the hazards. All risk treatment actions should be specific, measurable, and 
realistic. Considering risk treatment plans, these existing and/or suggested safeguards/mitigation 
measures are utilized to generate a residual risk.  
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With the addition of suitable provisions and safeguards, the risk should be reduced such that the 
residual risk is within the ALARP range and is tolerable.  
 
2.3 Precautionary Principle 
The simplest form of the precautionary principle can be described by the statement "better safe 
than sorry" or the notion to "err on the side of caution." The principle puts the burden of proof on 
the maker of a product and/or process to prove that it is safe rather than the public to prove potential 
harm. (Blank, 2020)  
 
There is some debate on the precise origins of the precautionary principle as the concept is not 
novel. Most literature credits the precautionary principle stemming from environmental debates 
and movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, the German concept known as 
vorsorgeprinzip (foresight principle). This principle was forged into German environmental law, 
and in 1987 at the International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, it entered into 
international law. (Epstein, 2019) 
 
There are varying definitions of "precautionary principle"; however, most noteworthy is that posed 
under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992, which stated: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
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The principle is ambiguous and leaves open for interpretation as to the appropriate "measures." 
(Cole, 2005) 
 
In 1998 clarification of the definition was offered at the Wingspread Conference in 
Racine, WI, USA, which stated: 
 
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully 
established scientifically.  
 
The precautionary principle is an avenue to aid in applying safeguards against potential serious 
harm or consequence in the face of scientific uncertainty. Uncertainty may be in regards to the 
nature of potential consequences or the likelihood of its occurrence. Safeguards or precautionary 
measures may be preventative or anticipatory in nature.  (Hayes, A. Wallace, The Precautionary 
Principle) 
 
2.4 ALARP  
Risks can not be entirely eliminated but can be mitigated and managed. Mitigating and managing 
risks to an acceptable level is fundamental to the ALARP principle. 
 
The ALARP or As Low As Reasonably Practicable Principle is a method of quantifying risk levels. 
The principle originated in the United Kingdom but is now a commonly used method of risk 
management worldwide. The ALARP principle is not prescriptive but rather puts the onus on duty-
holders to systematically determine tolerable risk.  
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ALARP has been defined by the Court of Appeal in its judgment in Edwards v. National Coal 
Board, [1949] 1 All ER 743 as: "‘Reasonably practicable’ is a narrower term than ‘physically 
possible’ … a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on 
one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in 
money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it is shown that there is a gross 
disproportion between them – the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice – the 
defendants discharge the onus on them.” (Health and Safety Executive, 2020) 
 
The ALARP principle is intended to allow duty holders to evaluate known hazards against the 
potential consequence by assessing applicable safeguards. It is intended to balance the need for 
additional safeguards against the reduction in the overall risk profile. The term ALARP is generally 
used to describe a state where all reasonable risk treatment options have been used to reduce risk 
to people and the environment to as low as reasonably practicable. (Pike, 2020) 
 
There is no set standard risk tolerance or prescriptive number to quantify the point at which risk 
level reaches ALARP and will vary from company to company. The ALARP principle is based on 
the reduction of risk through the addition of safeguards or levels of protection until the benefit of 
doing so is grossly disproportional to the time, cost or effort.  
 
Typically, in practice, ALARP means: 
• Compliance with good/best industry practice, and   
• Where good industry practice is not available, to: 
o Identify potential barriers to reduce the likelihood of the consequence. 
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 Incorporate those where cost is proportional to the risk reduction benefit. 
 Discard those whose cost is disproportionate to the reduction in risk. 
 
The ALARP principle is often best described using the ALARP triangle: 
 
Figure 3: ALARP Triangle (Welch, 2009) 
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ALARA stands for “As Low as Reasonably Achievable” and is synonymous with ALARP and is 
a term often used outside of the UK. For the purposes of this paper, ALARP is the preferred 
terminology.  
 
2.5 Risk to Personnel 
Individuals' risk levels are generally grouped into three distinct categories: broadly acceptable, 
conditional/tolerable, and unacceptable.  
 
 
Figure 4: Acceptance Criteria for Frequency of Number of Fatalities 
Hazardous events that may occur and/or affect individual personnel with a frequency of less than 
1.0E-06/year are generally considered “broadly acceptable.” Noting, however, that risk tolerance 
levels change from company to company as all will have slightly differing risk tolerance. These 
risks are considered to be low enough such that further risk reduction methods are not required 
and/or justified.  Like all hazardous events and associated risks, “broadly acceptable” risks should 
be monitored to ensure risk levels do not rise outside the acceptable range. 
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Hazardous events that way occur and/or affect individual personnel with a frequency of greater 
than 1.0E-06/year and less than 1.0E-05 are generally considered conditionally acceptable. These 
risks are deemed tolerable if it can be demonstrated that the risks have been reduced to ALARP.  
 
Hazardous events that may occur and/or affect individual personnel with a frequency of greater 
than 1.0E-05 are generally considered conditionally unacceptable. Events falling within the 
unacceptable range must have additional controls and mitigation measures put in place to reduce 
the risk to an acceptable level.  
 
To establish target levels of safety achievable for a facility, numerous safety studies must be 
employed. Typically, these studies may include hazard identification studies such as HAZIDs and 
MAE Bow-tie assessments as well as evaluation studies such as Fire and Blast analysis, Temporary 
Refuge impairment, Dropped object study, Radiation and Exhaust studies, Emergency Escape 
Evacuation Rescue study, and a Quantitative Risk Assessment.  
 
2.6 Risk Reduction Techniques 
2.6.1 Inherently Safe Design 
In the hierarchy of risk management or risk reduction techniques, an inherently safe design is of 
the highest importance. In an inherently safe design either the hazard is eliminated or the 
magnitude of the hazard is reduced such that the consequences are tolerable. An inherent safe 
design is generally established by utilizing four strategies: 
 
1. Minimize – involves minimizing the hazardous quantity and/or energy of a system to 
drastically reduce or eliminate the consequence of an event. 
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2. Moderate - involves modifying the event or material such that it is less hazardous and/or 
severe.  
3. Substitute – involves the substitution or replacement of a hazardous item, material, or 
process with one that is less hazardous.  
4. Simplify – involves the simplification of a process to help reduce or eliminate human error. 
(National Academy of Engineering, 2004) 
 
2.6.2 Safeguards 
A safeguard is an element of design that either aids in the prevention against the hazard or mitigates 
the level of severity of the consequences of a hazardous event. Safeguards, also referred to as 
barriers, can generally be classified into two broad categories: preventative barriers and mitigating 
barriers. (Crowl & Louvar, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 5: Preventative and Mitigating Barriers (Crowl & Louvar, 2011) 
 
A preventative barrier or safeguard is a proactive control against a threat, i.e., it prevents an 
initiating event from proceeding to an undesired event or incident. In contrast, a mitigating barrier 




According to Crowl and Louvar, there are generally four accepted categories of risk reduction 
strategies: inherent, passive, active, and procedural. (Crowl & Louvar, 2011) 
 
2.6.2.1 Passive 
Passive barriers may be either preventative or mitigating however, they do not require activation 
to aid in the reduction of risk. Typical passive barriers on an offshore installation would include 
barriers such as passive fire protection, bunding, blast/firewall, and decks. 
 
2.6.2.2 Active 
In the simplest form, active barriers require an automated activation or response, often triggered 
by a process change or upset. Active barriers include fire and gas detection systems, firewater and 
deluge systems, emergency shut down valves, etc. (Borisevic, Greenfield, & Potts, 2016) 
 
2.6.2.3 Procedural  
Procedural barriers are not automatic and require human intervention to trigger a response. In the 
hierarchy of safety barriers, procedural barriers are the least desirable as they rely on manual 
operations and can be prone to human error. Procedural barriers may include opening and/or 
closing of manual valves, emergency response plans, and activation of manual call points.  
 
2.7 Risk Evaluation Methods 
2.7.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
A fault tree is a logical method of identifying the potential ways that hazards may lead to an 
accident, known as a top event.  Logic functions are utilized in the fault tree from a top-down 
approach, working backward towards the various scenarios that could have resulted in the accident 
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or top event. (Crowl & Louvar, 2011) The fault tree visually displays the interrelationships 
between the top event/accident and the causes for this event. 
 
  
Figure 6: Fault Tree Sample (CS Odessa Corp., 2020) 
 
There are various components used in a creation of a fault tree with different symbols, labels, and 
identifiers, as shown below: 
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Figure 7: Fault Tree Identifiers and Symbols (Crowl & Louvar, 2011) 
 
Utilizing known probabilities for the basic events, the top event's likelihood can be quantitively 
determined in the fault tree analysis.   Alternatively, fault trees can be utilized qualitatively to 
determine the minimum cut set for the top event. (Adedigba, 2017) 
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2.7.2 Event Tree Analysis  
Complementary to the fault tree analysis is an event tree analysis. An event tree analysis evaluates 
the potential consequences leading from an initiating event. It employs a “forward-thinking” 
process whereby analysis begins with the initiating event and the factors leading to a final 
consequence are analyzed based on the success or failure of the evolved safety functions. (Crowl 
& Louvar, 2011) 
 
Event trees typically utilize Boolean logic gates ( i.e., yes/no, on/off ) and progress left to right to 
quantitively determine the probability of a consequence given the known probability of the 
initiating event and the success/failure of each system node (safety function). (RRC Training, 
2010)   
 
Figure 8: Sample Event Tree (RRC Training, 2010)   
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2.7.3 Bowtie Diagram/Analysis 
The bowtie hazard analysis technique combines the concepts of both Fault Tree Analysis and 
Event Tress Analysis. (Kim, 2015) The diagrams below illustrate how both analysis techniques fit 
together to form a bow-tie diagram. The FTA is represented to the left of the “Event” and the ETA 
is represented to the right of the “Event”.  
 




Figure 10: Bow-tie Analysis of FTA and ETA (Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Limited, 2020) 
The bowtie diagram clearly illustrates the factors “leading to” and the consequences “leading 
from” the hazardous event. It pictorially demonstrates the relationship between hazards, threats, 
potential consequences, and the prevention and mitigation barriers between them. It is a risk 
assessment tool that is a transparent and easily accessible method of documenting and presenting 
information and linking risk back to the management system. 
 
2.7.4 Swiss Cheese Model 
The Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Model is a risk management tool developed by James T. 
Reason in 1990.  The model was used to demonstrate how active and latent errors/failures 
contributed to an accident. Active errors are those such as unsafe acts that can be directly linked 
to an accident; whereas latent errors are contributory factors that may lie dormant for some time 
until they contribute to the accident. 
 
Each slice of cheese in the model represents a safety barrier relevant to the hazards or accident. 
Holes in the cheese represent errors or failures, either active or latent. Within the Swiss Cheese 
Model, each error or failure is seen as required however insufficient individually to cause the 
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accident. When there are exposed vulnerabilities in each safety barrier, i.e., holes in the slices of 
the cheese line up, an accident will occur.  
 
 
Figure 11: The Swiss Cheese Model of Human Error Causation (Albert, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 12: Swiss Cheese Model Highlighting Barriers  
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2.7.5 Safety Critical Elements 
Some barriers are considered Safety Critical Elements (SCE). In general terms, an SCE is any 
component, system, or an integral part of an installation whereby: 
• its failure could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident, or 
• its purpose is to prevent or limit the effects of a major accident. 
 
The C-NLOPB Drilling and Production Guidelines define an SCE as “components and systems of 
an installation that prevents incidents or mitigates the effect of an incident including a pollution 
event...” 
 
The regulator further defines an incident as: 
any event that causes 
(i) a lost or restricted workday injury, 
(ii) death, 
(iii) fire or explosion, 
(iv) loss of containment of any fluid from a well, 
(v) imminent threat to the safety of persons, an installation, or support craft, or 
(vi) pollution; 
any event that results in a missing person; or 
any event that causes: 
(i) the impairment of any structure, facility, equipment or system critical to the safety of 
persons, an installation or support craft, or 
(ii) the impairment of any structure, facility, equipment or system critical to environmental 
protection. (C-NLOPB, 2017) 
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The key requirement for Safety Critical Elements is that they must be suitable. SCEs and the 
associated Performance Standards are currently a requirement of an Installation’s Safety Plan 
under the current C-NLOPB regulatory regime. The SCE performance standard is a vehicle for 
describing the requirements that safety-critical elements should satisfy throughout the lifecycle of 
an installation. 
 
The performance standard describes: 
• components that make up the safety-critical element 
• functional requirements/what it is supposed to achieve  
• assurance activities on how it will be achieved 
 
In practice, the performance standard aids in establishing the health of an SCE and helps identify 





3 Major Accident Events 
3.1 Major Accident Hazards 
A major accident hazard can loosely be defined as a source of danger that has the potential to cause 
personnel fatality, significant damage to the asset, or major environmental consequences. Proper 
hazard identification is the first step in a strategic risk management plan. 
 
The characterization of major accident hazards and the subsequent events can differ on each 
facility; however major accident events typically include: 
• A fire, explosion, or release of a dangerous substance involving death or serious injury to 
one or more persons on the installation  
• Any event involving major damage to the structure of the installation or the loss of stability 
• The collision of a helicopter with the installation 
• Environmental loading/iceberg impact 
• Any other event arising for a work activity involving death or personnel injury to five or 
more persons 
 
The methods of controlling major accident hazards in current and future installations rely heavily 
on learning from past major accidents. Some of the most noteworthy major accidents in the oil and 
gas industry include: 
1. Ocean Ranger  
2. Piper Alpha 




3.1.1 Ocean Ranger  
The Ocean Ranger was an offshore semisubmersible drilling rig (MODU). The rig was the largest 
of its class and was owned by Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co (ODECO). During the early 
1980s, the Ocean Ranger was under contract with Mobil Oil Canada Ltd., drilling exploration 
wells for the Hibernia oil field off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.  
 




On February 15th, 1982, approximately 170 nautical miles off the coast of St. John’s, the Ocean 
Ranger capsized and sunk, taking with it the lives of all 84 crew members. The date marks one of 
the most tragic major accidents in local and international marine history.  
 
The below figure depicts the probable orientation of the Ocean Ranger on the night of the accident.  
 
Figure 14: Ocean Ranger Probable Orientation on February 15, 1982. (Heising & Grenzebach, 
1989) 
 
Following the tragedy, the federal and provincial government appointed the Royal Commission to 
conduct an investigation into the Ocean Ranger Disaster. The investigation aimed to determine the 
potential causes of the tragedy, why there were no survivors, and to gather learnings on how to 
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avoid similar marine disasters in the future. (Higgins, Response to the Ocean Ranger Disaster, 
2018). The Royal Commission completed a qualitative assessment that concluded that the 
capsizing could be attributed to severe weather, numerous design fails, and human error. The Royal 
Commission noted the following contributing factors:   
1. The ballast control room was ill-positioned, located in the third column below the lower 
deck, which was only 28 ft. above mean water level. This was considered a major design 
flaw as the location was susceptible to water ingress in the event of severe weather. 
2. There were no means of protection from the possibility of water ingress for the ballast 
control console and its components.  
3. The Ocean Ranger ballast room was outfitted with four portlights to allow the operator to 
view operations and monitor vessel draft. During the storm, the crew failed to close the 
deadlights (covers) on the portholes.   
4. The Royal Commission also noted that the crew had insufficient training and understanding 
of the ballast control system's functioning in an emergency situation. (Heising & 
Grenzebach, 1989) 
5. There was inadequate lifesaving equipment aboard the rig and the crew lacked sufficient 
training in its use.  
6. Rescue operations were poor and crew aboard the standby vessel, which was located too 
far from the Ocean Ranger to timely aid in the evacuation, were insufficiently trained, and 
did not have the appropriate tools for rescue operations.  
 
Stemming from this tragedy was the recognition of the regulatory shortcomings of Canadian and 
Newfoundland oil and gas operations. The regulatory framework at the time was complex. Three 
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agencies governed the industry: the federal government through COGLA (Canada Oil and Gas 
Lands Administration), the provincial government through the NLPD (Newfoundland-Labrador 
Petroleum Directorate), and the United States Coast Guard. None of the agencies adequately 
monitored or enforced their standards and guidelines due to the regulatory framework's overly 
complicated nature.  
 
The Royal Commission published 66 recommendations regarding why the Ocean Ranger sank 
with no survivors and an additional 70 recommendations on how to increase worker safety in 
offshore operations. (Higgins, Response to the Ocean Ranger Disaster, 2018).  
 
The Ocean Ranger disaster paved the way for the beginning of tighter safety and rescue equipment 
requirements, increased oil and gas worker training as well as aided in the development of a single 
regulatory body. The Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board was established in 1985, 
later renamed Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB).  
(Higgins, Response to the Ocean Ranger Disaster, 2018).  
 
3.1.2 Piper Alpha 
The Piper Alpha was a fixed oil production platform located in the North Sea’s Piper oilfield, 
covering 12 square miles (31 square kilometers). The Piper Alpha was located approximately 120 
miles (193 kilometers) off the coast of Aberdeen, UK, in approximately 474 feet (144 meters) of 
water.  (The Maritime Executive, 2018). The field was discovered in 1973, and shortly after, the 
platform was built modularly by McDermott Engineering and Union Industrielle d'Entreprise 
(UIE) of Cherbourg and mated in 1975. (Wikipedia, 2020). As an oil-only facility, it began 
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producing in 1976 operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Limited with a design 
throughput of 40,000 m3/day (250,000 barrels per day) of oil. (Shallcross, 2013).  
 
Figure 15: The Piper Alpha Platform (Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute 
of Chemical Engineers, 2012) 
 
Figure 16: Piper Field (Macleod & Richardson, 2018) 
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On July 6, 1988, a day in history was marked with tragedy and disaster. The Piper Alpha platform 
experienced a series of catastrophic explosions and fires, destroying the platform and taking with 
it the lives of 167 personnel.  (Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers, 2012). Marked with great tragedy, the Piper Alpha disaster is one of the most 
defining Major Accident Events in history for the oil and gas industry. It was the world’s largest 
offshore oil disaster, affecting 10% of the UK oil production and financial losses estimated at £2 
billion ($3.5 billion Canadian). (Macleod & Richardson, 2018) 
 
The Piper Alpha tragedy, including its effect on the regulatory regime, is further discussed in 
Section 4. 
 
3.1.3 Deepwater Horizon 
The Deepwater Horizon was a deep water, dynamically positioned, semi-submersible mobile 
offshore drilling unit. It was built in 2001 and owned by Transocean and then leased to BP. The 
rig was capable of operating in water up to 2400m with a maximum drill depth of 9100m. 
(Wikipedia, 2020) 
 
In 2010 the Deepwater Horizon began drilling an exploratory well at the Macondo Prospect in the 
Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana.  On August 20th, 2010, a tragic well blowout occurred, 
resulting in the escape of hydrocarbons and subsequence explosions and fire on the rig. The fire 
continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. The event resulted in the death of 11 crew members and 
injury to 17 more.  The event also had a significant environmental impact, as the well continued 
to flow for 87 days. (BP, 2010). The Deep Water Horizon oil spill was the largest spill in the 




Figure 17: Deepwater Horizon Semi-submersible Drilling Rig (Wikipedia, 2020) 
 
BP conducted an internal investigation following the accident to determine the potential causes of 
the incident and to aid in the prevention of similar further events. Like all disasters, no single action 
was the cause, and the report listed eight key findings: 
• The annulus cement barrier did not properly isolate the well hydrocarbons.  
• The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.  
• A negative-pressure test that was conducted prior to temporarily abandoning the well was 
inaccurately accepted. The test is used to verify the integrity of mechanical barriers such 
as shoe track and casing barriers.  
• The drill crew did not recognize the influx until hydrocarbons were in the riser.  
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• The chosen well control response actions, to divert fluids to the mud gas separator, failed 
to regain control of the well.  
• Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.  
• The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition as it was found that 
hydrocarbons had migrated outside electrically classified areas. 
• The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.  (BP, 2010) 
 
Outside of BPs internal investigation, in May of 2010, the president of the United States created 
an independent National Commission to investigate the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Their mission 
was to determine the causes of the tragedy, improve the ability to respond to oil spills, and make 
recommendations to increase the safety of offshore oil and gas operations. (Graham, et al., 2011) 
 
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling concluded 
that, like most major accidents, the loss could have been prevented. It stemmed from a series of 
mistakes on the part of BP, Transocean, and Halliburton that were viewed as “systematic failures 
in risk management that place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.” (Graham, et al., 
2011). The commission faulted the industry and government for being ill-prepared for risks 
associated with drilling in increasing water depths and pioneering these new deepwater depths. 
The Commission called for increased regulatory oversight into planning and operations and 
increased enforcement for oil and gas operations, in particular deepwater drilling. Additionally, 
the Commission recognized the laws, regulations, and practices concerning minimizing the 
environmental impact of a spill were insufficient for deepwater drilling in conditions such as in 
the Macondo Prospect. (Graham, et al., 2011) 
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The former members of the Commission, in 2020, stated that the U.S. Congress had not 
implemented most of the recommendations in the final report. The Commission did recognize that 




















4 Piper Alpha  - Influence on Regulatory Regime 
Following the Piper Alpha disaster, the United Kingdom Secretary of State called for a public 
inquiry to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident, the proposed causes, and 
recommendations to avoid similar accidents in the future.  The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha 
Disaster, which has come to be known as the Cullen Report, was issued in 1990 and written by 
The Honorable Lord Cullen.  
 
The following figure shows the Piper Alpha platform, associated platforms, and Flotta Oil 
Terminal.  
 




Figure 19: Piper Field (Macleod & Richardson, 2018) 
The platform was originally an oil-only production platform with 32 well slots. The oil, gas, and 
water produced were separated on the platform by the main production separators. Two booster 
pumps were used to pump the oil to the oil export line, then to the Flotta Oil Terminal. (Shallcross, 
2013). The water was further treated and then routed to the overboard discharge line. Initially, the 
gas was compressed and sent to flare.  
 
The platform consisted of four main production areas or modules, modules A-D, located at the 
production deck level. Module A housed the wellheads, Module B housed the production 
separators, Module C the gas compression plant, and Module D contained the electrical plant and 
miscellaneous facilities. On top of the deck was the drilling deck housing the drilling and mud 
modules. The living quarters were on the top deck with a helideck above. (Cullen, 1990).  
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Figure 20: Piper Alpha Platform – West Elevation (Cullen, 1990) 
  
Figure 21: Piper Alpha Platform – East Elevation (Cullen, 1990) 
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In 1978, in order to comply with changing Government policy, means of exporting gas off the 
platform were required. This meant that the gas was purified and pumped to the MCP-01 gas 
compression platform where it was intermingled with gas from the Frigg field before it was 
pumped to the British Gas collecting plant at St. Fergus. (Cullen, 1990). To enable the gas 
exportation, the Piper Alpha was first retrofitted with a gas dehydration unit and a Joule-Thomson 
(JT) expansion valve. Further modifications were made in 1980 with the installation of improved 
facilities for drying and expansion of gas as well as a distillation column to remove gas from the 
condensation. With the improved facilities for the drying and expansion of gas, the first gas 
dehydration unit was removed in 1983. The location of the Gas Conversion Module (GCM) is 
visible in the figure above. The original design of the Piper Alpha physically distanced the 
production side of the platform, the most hazardous side, from the personnel and control spaces. 
The GCM now occupied space adjacent to personnel occupied critical control spaces.  
 
In the processing stream, the separated water and hydrogen sulphide (H2S) were removed in 
molecular sieves, and the gas was compressed and then cooled by expansion. The heavier fractions 
of gas (propane) were condensed as a liquid and the remaining gas (methane) was exported. A 
large vessel that was connected to two parallel condensate pumps (A and B) collected the 
condensate and injected it into the oil for export to Flotta. (Macleod & Richardson, 2018) 
 
Operating without the use of the GCM was known as Phase 1 operations; operating with the use 
of GCM was referred to as Phase 2 operations. According to the Cullen report, the Piper Alpha 
was operated in Phase 2 from December 1980 until July 1988, with the exception of the period 
from April to June 1984, as well as the few days leading up to the accident.  
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4.1 History of Events 
• At approximately 22:00 on July 6, 1988, the initial explosion occurred on the Piper 
Alpha's production deck. 
• Fire immediately followed at the West face of Module B, including a fireball. 
• Fire spread to Module C and downward. Dense smoke engulfed most of the upper 
portions of the platform. 
• Series of smaller explosions followed the initial explosion. 
• Emergency systems failed to operate, including firewater and deluge systems.  
• 226 personnel were on board and three maydays were sent out, including a call to 
abandon the platform.  
• Due to the immense smoke and fire, personnel were unable to evacuate by helicopter 
or lifeboat. 
• At approximately 22:20, there was a rupture of the Tartan gas riser, causing another 
major explosion. 
• The Cullen report notes that a message was sent from The Piper Alpha to the Tharos 
platform that read: “People majority in galley area. Tharos come. Gangway. Hoses. 
Getting bad.” 
• At approximately 22:45, firewater monitor spray from the Tharos platform reached the 
Piper Alpha however the gangway was not landed.  
• At 22:50 rupture of the MCP-01 riser occurred, causing another catastrophic explosion. 
• This explosion started the structural collapse, caused the Tharos to pull back, men to 
jump from parts of the platform, and destroyed the Fast Rescue Craft (FRC), taking the 
lives of those of most onboard.  
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• At 23:20 the Claymore gas riser ruptured, causing further explosions and further 
collapse of the platform. More men jumped from the platform at the pipe deck level, 
some of whom were survivors.  
• By 00:45 the center of the Piper Alpha had collapsed with the risers and gas pipelines 
torn apart.  
• That night the Piper Alpha has 62 survivors (one of whom later died in hospital) and 
one survivor of the Sandhaven FRC crew. The disaster took the lives of 165 Piper Alpha 
crew members along with the lives of 2 FRC crew members. (Cullen, 1990). Of those 
deceased, 109 deaths were attributed to smoke inhalation, 13 due to drowning, 11 due 
to burns and miscellaneous injury, 4 of unknown causes, and 30 bodies were never 
recovered. (Macleod & Richardson, 2018) 
• It took over three weeks for the fires to be extinguished, with the Piper Alpha's remains 
finally sinking on March 28, 1989. (Macleod & Richardson, 2018) 
 
4.2 Findings 
The Cullen report concluded that the most probable source of the initial explosion was a 
concentration of condensate (propane) in Module C. It has found that on July 6, 1988, condensate 
pump A was isolated under permit for required maintenance. Under a previous and separate permit 
the pressure safety relief valve associated with Pump A had been removed and blind flange put in 
its place; the blind flange was not pressure or leak tested.  
 
As per Macleod and Richardson, “At about 21.45 on 06 July 1988, condensate pump B tripped. 
Shortly afterward, gas alarms activated, the first-stage gas compressors tripped, and the flare was 
observed to be much larger than usual.” 
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It was likely that as pump B had tripped, operators would have restarted pump A as they would 
have been unaware of the missing pressure relief valve due to the nature of the Piper Alpha work 
permit system. Upon restart of pump A, condensate leaked from the unsecured blind flange. It is 
believed that 30kg of condensate over 30 seconds of leakage caused a hydrocarbon gas cloud to 
form. When this flammable cloud found its ignition source, the initial explosion and fire occurred.  
(Macleod & Richardson, 2018) (Cullen, 1990) 
 
Following the Cullen Investigation, several contributing factors related to the design, operation, 
emergency response, training, and safety culture were found to formulate the root causes of the 
disaster;  
• Management of change system was flawed and/or lacking. There were very poor design 
choices during the retrofit of the platform for gas exportation. The process safety design 
failed to recognize and/or effectively mitigate against the new hazards and risks (fire and 
blast) associated with the processing of gas for export.  The new GCM module was 
physically located adjacent to the control room and below the accommodations module, 
electrical power supply, and radio room. Explosions badly damaged the control and radio 
rooms, severing communication. (Cullen, 1990) 
• The platform's fundamental safety design lacked in fireproofing/passive fire protection and 
lack of blast walls. With the addition of the gas module, the increased risk of explosion 
was not realized and/or mitigated against as there was no protection from blast 
overpressure.   
• The permit to work system and shift change-over procedures were found to be flawed. The 
permit to work system largely relied on informal communication. Permits were filed by 
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trade, rather than system or location, with suspended permits residing in the Safety Office 
rather than the Control Room. At shift changeover, crews often did not discuss suspended 
permits. The permit to work was a flawed system; operators were unable to see the status 
of all components of a safety-critical system. In addition to the inadequacy of the permit to 
work procedure for the Piper Alpha, the Cullen Report also noted that there was inadequate 
training on the system, resulting in a procedure that was not complied with nor monitored. 
• Fire pumps were placed in manual mode as the Piper Alpha placed personnel safety above 
process safety. They chose to leave the fire pumps in manual mode to protect divers from 
potential injury due to the suction of the pumps. The risk management was flawed in that 
the MAE potential was not realized or prioritized. With the fire pumps placed in manual 
mode for the majority of the time, the only way to activate the pumps was local. During 
the disaster, the smoke and fire intensity was too great for the crew members to reach the 
pumps.  
• The firewater system was poorly maintained on the Piper Alpha. The sprinkler and deluge 
heads were blocked, which would have greatly hindered this system's effectiveness if the 
firewater pumps had activated and the ring main was intact from the blast.   
• The Piper Alpha had access to a large hydrocarbon inventory as it was interconnected with 
Claymore, Tartan, and MCP-01. The export oil from the Piper Alpha joined with oil from 
Claymore and Tartan into a single line to Flotta. The other platforms delayed show-down, 
continuing to produce after the initial explosion. Additionally, the emergency shut-down 
valve on the Piper Alpha export line failed to fully close, allowing oil to reverse flow from 
the connected platforms adding more fuel to the fire.  
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• The Piper Alpha’s primary method of evacuation was meant to be by helicopter, but due 
to the dense smoke, helicopters were unable to land. In addition to the unavailability of 
evacuation by helicopter, not a single lifeboat or life raft was successfully launched during 
the attempts to abandon the platform. The Piper Alpha had very poor emergency response 
planning and evacuation training of their crew.  
• There was a lack of safety culture regarding management oversight, whereby previous 
incidents were ignored, and opportunities for improvements were pushed to the side.  
(Cullen, 1990)  
 
The Cullen Inquiry resulted in 106 recommendations, all of which were accepted and acted upon. 
Of the 106 recommendations, 57 were to be overseen by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
operators of installations were responsible for 40, 8 were directed at the entire industry, and the 
remaining for the Standby Ship Owners Association. (Oil & Gas UK the voice of the offshore 
industry, 2008). 
 
The recommendations included improvements to the permit to work management systems, 
modifications to emergency shutdown valve placements, subsea isolation systems, mitigations for 
smoke hazards, improved escape and evacuation systems, and the requirement for formal safety 
assessments. The most influential recommendation from the Cullen report was the establishment 
of new safety regulations. The need for stronger safety and risk management regimes was 
recognized globally, and legislation (in the UK) was put in place to help aid in the prevention of 
future disasters. These regulations would require all duty-holders (owners/operators) of every 
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installation operating in UK waters to submit a safety case for acceptance by the HSE. (Oil & Gas 
UK the voice of the offshore industry, 2008) 
 
In the UK, The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations came into force in 1992. The 
safety case is a comprehensive document that details the way in which a duty- holder intends to 
control the major accident hazards on the installation and describes the methods that will be used 
for managing health and safety. The Safety Case regulations require that all hazards are identified 
and appropriate controls are put in place such that the residual risk is ALARP, therefore implying 
that a QRA is required. (Vinnem & Røed, 2019) 
This legislation promoted a global shift in safety culture and the need for stronger regulations. 
While legislation varies based on the location, the general requirement today remains the same - 
hazards must be identified, and risks must be assessed to ensure they are as low as reasonably 
practicable. The Piper Alpha tragedy and the subsequent findings played a crucial role in the 







5 Local Offshore Requirements and Regulations 
5.1 Canada‐Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C‐NLOPB) 
In 1985, the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act was signed 
between the federal and provincial governments, allowing for the formation of the Canada‐
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C‐NLOPB). The C-NLOPB was given 
the authority to regulate the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore oil and gas industry. Such 
authority was derived from Canada‐Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation 
Newfoundland and Labrador Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C‐2 and the Canada‐Newfoundland and 
Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c.3 (Accord Acts).  This allowed the C-
NLOPB to oversee offshore operator activity to ensure compliance with legislative and regulatory 
requirements, including offshore safety, environmental protection, resource management, and 
industrial benefits. (C-NLOPB, 2020) 
 
The C-NLOPB regulations have been developed and have been continuously evolving with new 
learnings and better practices.  
 
Newfoundland Offshore Area Oil and Gas Operations Regulations (SOR/88-347) were registered 
on June 30, 1988, after being published in the Canada Gazette on February 13, 1988. (C-NLOPB, 
2014) 
 
The Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installations Regulations (SOR/95-104) were officially 
registered in 1995 after publication in the Canada Gazette in 1994. (C-NLOPB, 2020) 
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Similar to the UK Safety Case regulations, the C-NLOPB Installation Regulations (2020) require 
every installation to complete a Concept Safety Analysis (CSA). The CSA is to be submitted as a 
part of the development plan application process. The CSA quantitatively evaluates risk to life and 
the environment and evaluates those risks against agreed target levels of safety. The CSA is 
developed in the early stages of a project to form the preliminary quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) of the potential major accident hazards affecting the platform. As the CSA is a preliminary 
study, it often provides recommendations of improvement for development into later states of a 
facility. The C-NLOPB Installation Regulations, Section 43, Concept Safety Analysis for 
Production Installations, defines the details required and states:  
43 (1) Every operator shall, at the time the operator applies for a development plan 
approval in respect of a production installation, submit to the Chief a concept safety 
analysis of the installation in accordance with subsection (5), that considers all 
components and all activities associated with each phase in the life of the production 
installation, including the construction, installation, operation and removal phases. 
 
(2) The concept safety analysis referred to in subsection (1) shall 
 
(a) be planned and conducted in such a manner that the results form part of the basis for 
decisions that affect the level of safety for all activities associated with each phase in the 
life of the production installation; and 
 
(b) take into consideration the quality assurance program selected in accordance with 
section 4. 
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(3) Target levels of safety for the risk to life and the risk of damage to the environment 
associated with all activities within each phase of the life of the production installation 
shall be defined and shall be submitted to the Chief at the time the operator applies for a 
development plan approval. 
 
(4) The target levels of safety referred to in subsection (3) shall be based on assessments 
that are 
 
(a) quantitative, where it can be demonstrated that input data are available in the quantity 
and of the quality necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the results; and 
 
(b) qualitative, where quantitative assessment methods are inappropriate or not suitable. 
 
(5) The concept safety analysis referred to in subsection (1) shall include 
 
(a) for each potential accident, a determination of the probability or susceptibility of its 
occurrence and its potential consequences without taking into account the plans and 
measures described in paragraphs (b) to (d); 
 
(b) for each potential accident, contingency plans designed to avoid the occurrence of, 
mitigate or withstand the accident; 
 
(c) for each potential accident, personnel safety measures designed to 
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(i) protect, from risk to life, all personnel outside the immediate vicinity of the accident 
site, 
 
(ii) provide for the safe and organized evacuation of all personnel from the production 
installation, where the accident could lead to an uncontrollable situation, 
 
(iii) provide for a safe location for personnel until evacuation procedures can be 
implemented, where the accident could lead to an uncontrollable situation, and 
 
(iv) ensure that the control station, communications facilities or alarm facilities directly 
involved in the response to the accident remain operational throughout the time that 
personnel are at risk; 
 
(d) for each potential accident, appropriate measures designed to minimize the risk of 
damage to the environment; 
 
(e) for each potential accident, an assessment of the determination referred to in paragraph 
(a) and of the implementation of the plans and measures described in paragraphs (b) to 
(d); 
 
(f) a determination of the effects of any potential additional risks resulting from the 
implementation of the plans and measures described in paragraphs (b) to (d); and 
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(g) a definition of the situations and conditions and of the changes in operating procedures 
and practices that would necessitate an update of the concept safety analysis. 
 
(6) The determinations and assessments required by paragraphs (5)(a) and (e), 
respectively, shall be 
 
(a) quantitative, where it can be demonstrated that input data is available in the quantity 
and of the quality necessary to demonstrate reliability of the results; and 
 
(b) qualitative, where quantitative assessment methods are inappropriate or not suitable. 
 
(7) The plans and measures identified under paragraphs (5)(b) to (d) shall be designed to 
ensure that the target levels of safety as defined pursuant to subsection (3) are met. 
 
(8) The operator shall maintain and update the concept safety analysis referred to in 
subsection (1) in accordance with the definition of situations, conditions and changes 
referred to in paragraph (5)(g) to reflect operational experience, changes in activity or 
advances in technology. (C-NLOPB, 2020) 
 
Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations SOR/2009-316 came into 
force June 1, 2009. (C-NLOPB, 2014). Within the regulations are the regulations surrounding the 
“Application for Authorization.” Section 6, Application for Authorization, states: 
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The application for authorization shall be accompanied by 
(a) a description of the scope of the proposed activities; 
(b) an execution plan and schedule for undertaking those activities; 
(c) a safety plan that meets the requirements of section 8; 
(d) an environmental protection plan that meets the requirements of section 9; 
(e) information on any proposed flaring or venting of gas, including the rationale and the 
estimated rate, quantity and period of the flaring or venting; 
(f) information on any proposed burning of oil, including the rationale and the estimated 
quantity of oil proposed to be burned; 
(g) in the case of a drilling installation, a description of the drilling and well control 
equipment; 
(h) in the case of a production installation, a description of the processing facilities and 
control system; 
(i) in the case of a production project, a field data acquisition program that allows 
sufficient pool pressure measurements, fluid samples, cased hole logs and formation flow 
tests for a comprehensive assessment of the performance of development wells, pool 
depletion schemes and the field; 
(j) contingency plans, including emergency response procedures, to mitigate the effects of 
any reasonably foreseeable event that might compromise safety or environmental 
protection, which shall 
(i) provide for coordination measures with any relevant municipal, provincial, territorial 
or federal emergency response plan, and 
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(ii) in an area where oil is reasonably expected to be encountered, identify the scope and 
frequency of the field practice exercise of oil spill countermeasures; and 
(k) a description of the decommissioning and abandonment of the site, including methods 
for restoration of the site after its abandonment. (C-NLOPB, 2014) 
 
With reference to the safety plan, Section 8, states: 
 
8) The safety plan shall set out the procedures, practices, resources, sequence of key safety-
related activities and monitoring measures necessary to ensure the safety of the proposed 
work or activity and shall include 
(a) a summary of and references to the management system that demonstrate how it will 
be applied to the proposed work or activity and how the duties set out in these Regulations 
with regard to safety will be fulfilled; 
(b) a summary of the studies undertaken to identify hazards and to evaluate safety risks 
related to the proposed work or activity; 
(c) a description of the hazards that were identified and the results of the risk evaluation; 
(d) a summary of the measures to avoid, prevent, reduce and manage safety risks; 
(e) a list of all structures, facilities, equipment and systems critical to safety and a summary 
of the system in place for their inspection, testing and maintenance; 
(f) a description of the organizational structure for the proposed work or activity and the 
command structure on the installation, which clearly explains 
(i) their relationship to each other, and 
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(ii) the contact information and position of the person accountable for the safety plan and 
of the person responsible for implementing it; 
(g) if the possibility of pack sea ice or drifting icebergs exists at the drill or production site, 
the measures to address the protection of the installation, including systems for ice 
detection, surveillance, data collection, reporting, forecasting and, if appropriate, ice 
avoidance or deflection; and 
(h) a description of the arrangements for monitoring compliance with the plan and for 
measuring performance in relation to its objectives. (C-NLOPB, 2014) 
 
The C-NLOPB, in conjunction with the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board 
(CNSOPB), issued guidelines to aid operators in understanding the Safety Plan requirements and 
the Board's expectations for regulatory compliance. As per the regulations, a Safety Plan must 
accompany an application for an operations authorization. In 2011 the Safety Plan Guidelines were 
issued. (National Energy Board, 2011) 
 
It should be noted that the Safety Plan Guideline makes reference to the concept of ALARP; while 
guidelines are not regulations, they represent the Board's expectations. With respect to hazard 
identification, evaluation, and risk management, The Safety Plan Guidelines state: 
While the concept ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) is not discussed in the 
Regulations, this concept has been used for a number of years by industry and numerous 
agencies in considering safety matters and reduction of risk. Industry may demonstrate 
incorporation of ALARP into their risk reduction and associated mitigating measures 
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through a number of means, including a combination of qualitative analysis, quantitative 























6 Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities  
6.1 Local Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities 
There are currently four production facilities offshore Newfoundland: Hibernia platform, Terra 
Nova FPSO, SeaRose FPSO, and Hebron platform. 
 
6.1.1 Hibernia 
The first oil field of discovery was the Hibernia field, found in 1979, approximately 315km off the 
East coast of St. John’s, on the Grand Banks in the Jeanne d’Arc Basin. Owned by the Hibernia 
Management and Development Company Ltd (HMDC), the Hibernia platform development began 
in 1986. Hibernia is a gravity-based structure with both drilling and production facilities. The 
topsides consist of drilling, production, and utility facilities, as well as living quarters for 
approximately 185 people. The gravity-based structure, which supports the topsides from the 
ocean floor, has the capacity to store 1.3 million barrels of oil.  The construction of the platform 
began in 1991 and once it was towed to the field had its first oil in 1997. The Hibernia platform is 
still producing with an annual production rate of 220,000 barrels per day. (HMDC, 2020) 
 
6.1.2 Terra Nova FPSO 
The Terra Nova field is located approximately 350kms southeast of Newfoundland and was the 
second-largest oil discovery on the Newfoundland Grand Banks. The field was first discovered in 
1986 by then Petro-Canada. The Terra Nova is a Floating, Production, Storage, and Offloading 
vessel, 292.3 meters long and 45.5 meters wide. The FPSO can accommodate approximately 120 
people and can store 960,000 barrels of oil. The FPSO was built in 2000 and began production in 
2002. The Terra Nova FPSO is operated by Suncor Energy, with Suncor Energy owning the 
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majority of interests along with ExxonMobil, Equinor, Husky Energy, Murphy Oil, Mosbacher 
Operating and Chevron Canada. (Suncor, 2020) 
 
6.1.3 SeaRose FPSO 
The White Rose oil field is located approximately 350kms east-southeast off the coast of 
Newfoundland, located in the Jeanne d’Arc Basin. The field was discovered in 1984 with an 
estimated 440 million barrels of recoverable oil. The White Rose oil field is produced by the 
SeaRose FPSO, which is 267 meters in length and 46 meters wide.  The FPSO can accommodate 
approximately 90 personnel and has a cargo capacity of 148,200m³ of liquids.  The FPSO was 
built in 2004 and began producing in 2005 and is operated and owned, in the majority, by Husky 
Energy. (Ship Technology, 2020) 
 
6.1.4 Hebron 
The Hebron oil field is located approximately 340kms off the southeast coast of St. John’s in the 
Jeanne d’Arc Basin. The field was discovered in 1980 with an estimated 700 million barrels of 
recoverable oil. Development of the Hebron Platform began in 2010 with the commencement of 
the Front End Engineering and Design (FEED). The platform is a gravity-based structure with both 
drilling and production facilities. The topsides of the platform began fabrication in 2013 and 
consists of drilling, production, and utilities facilities as well as living quarters for approximately 
220 people. The GBS stands 122m with a base diameter of 130 meters and can store approximately 
1.2 million barrels of oil. The platform is operated by its majority-owned shareholder ExxonMobil 
Canada Properties. Other shareholders include Chevron Canada Limited, Suncor Energy Inc., 
Equinor Ltd., and Nalcor Energy - Oil and Gas Inc. The Hebron Platform began hook-up and 
commissioning in 2016 and had its first oil in 2017. (The Hebron Project Office, 2015) 
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6.2 Asset Life Extension 
Each of the facilities is required to have and maintain a safety plan, as per the requirements of the 
C-NLOPB as a condition of the facilities Certificate of Fitness (COF) and Operations 
Authorization (OA). As each of the facilities is subject to ongoing regulatory oversight by the C-
NLOPB, the COF and OA are regularly renewed.  
 
Three of the four facilities offshore Newfoundland are aging and coming upon their original design 
life. New oil discoveries, further reserves, and facility extensions are urging owners and operators 
to extend the life of their existing facilities past the original design life. As facilities age, there are 
new hazards and differing risks to the overall facility. As an asset ages, the facility must be 
reviewed to determine the service life of all safety-critical systems. Aging mechanisms, asset 
integrity, and modifications to the facility must be reviewed and revalidated. Asset history and 
performance must be thoroughly reviewed and understood. Inspections, failure analysis, recorded 
incidents, and industry information with respect to similar assets and individual components 
should be analyzed to determine the overall integrity of the piece of equipment. (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
 
The C-NLOPB issued ALE guidance intended to aid operators in the successful completion of 
their respective Asset Life Extension (ALE) projects. The following figure depicts the suggested 




Figure 22: CAN-NL Offshore Area Process for ALE (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
With respect to safety-critical systems and equipment, it is required that systems and securities be 
in place to ensure their reliability, availability, and sustainability during the facility's life. With an 
asset life extension project, decisions must be made on each of these systems to determine if 
components will be maintained, repaired, re-rated, or entirely replaced. The service life assessment 
does not only pertain to physical assets but also extends into software systems, maintenance 
regimes, skills, and training that may need to be adjusted or modified with an extended facility 
life.  
 
The C-NLOPB has issued guidance and guidelines on the asset life extension program. Within the 
guidance, it notes the following considerations must be made when assessing the feasibility of 
extending a service life: 
• Aging / deteriorations  
• Fatigue  
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• Changes to environmental loads  
• Hazard profile change of installation  
• Process and well condition changes over time  
• Installation modification  
• Obsolescence  
• Technology and knowledge advances  
• Limitations of monitoring programs and techniques (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
 
The initial safety-critical element assessment should begin with the collection of SCE data. This 
would entail the review of the original design basis documentation along with the operating, 
inspection, and maintenance history of the equipment. It should also include input from various 
functions supporting the asset to ensure procedural and human factors associated with any asset 
extension, not already captured by the maintenance system, are taken into consideration.  
 
Secondly, a Verified Service Life must be established. A specified design or service life is intended 
to mitigate the operational failure of a piece of equipment due to time-dependent degradation 
mechanisms. In some cases, the service and/or design life of a piece of equipment may have been 
specified in the equipment's original design documentation. In other cases, service life must be 
established based on engineering judgment after assessment of the equipment condition, 
discussions with the original manufacturer, maintenance history, and current and predicted future 
operating conditions.  At a minimum, the following systems should be assessed to establish the 
VSL of all SCEs and supporting systems:  
• Structures 
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• Production Systems 
• Marine Systems 
• Pipelines and Subsea 
• Drilling Systems 
• Safety and Environmental Systems 
• Wells 
• Electrical Systems 
• Pressure Systems 
• Control and Instrumentation 
• Mechanical Handling Systems 
• Communications Systems (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
 
Utilizing a piece of equipment beyond its service life reduces its reliability and increases the risk 
of failure and potential required maintenance. With the VSL of all SCE equipment established, a 
Preliminary Life Extension Plan (PLEP) must be developed to extend the VSL of all equipment 
and systems to the facility's new forecasted end of life. To mitigate this risk, a list of required 
upgrades, maintenance strategies, repairs, or replacements must be made to close established gaps 
in extending the VSL to the new end of life to ensure it remains fit for purpose. The established 
gaps will vary in magnitude and potential consequence and therefore overall risk. The PLEP should 
prioritize the established gaps based on a risk-based prioritization. (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
 
With an established PLEP and alignment with both the C-NLOPB and the facility Certifying 
Authority (CA), the Operator can plan and establish the Life Extension Project (LEP). The LEP 
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must include all the necessary actions/repairs/replacements to ensure the affected safety-critical 
systems are able to provide the necessary level of protection against the established Major 
Accident Hazards. This will include all items stemming from the previously completed/revalidated 
studies, inspections, as well as CA and regulatory input. (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
 
As previously stated, each facility is subject to ongoing regulatory oversight, including the asset 
life extension period. Before the C-NLOPB renews an OA, the CA must issue a renewed COF. 
During the asset life extension phase, this includes a plan for the life-extension project which 
demonstrates that all necessary activities will be completed before the life-extension period.  
 
The Safety Plan is one of the documents that must be updated and revised for aging facilities OA 
renewal. As per the C-NLOPB ALE guidance document, the following topics should be included:  
• Defined timeframes of SCE inspections and risk assessments specifically for aging 
issues 
• Structural integrity assessments 
• ALARP demonstration  
• Fire and explosion risk assessments 
• Design parameter identifications 
• Aging processes 
• Changes in operating conditions and any performance standards that may limit the 
life of the installation, or of its SCE (C-NLOPB, 2019) 
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The Asset Design Life Extension Program Guideline issued by the C-NLOPB makes it clear that 
managing the risk of an aging platform, with respect to safety-critical equipment and processes, is 
of paramount importance. The previously completed risk analysis documents must be reviewed 
and revalidated, and changing and new hazards must be realized.  
 
With respect to asset life extension for local offshore oil and gas facilities, the notion is somewhat 
new to the region as the facilities are only now approaching the end of their original design life. 
While a new concept for the local region, extending facility design life has been practiced in other 
regions. As asset life extension is not a novel notion, the concept of ALARP is more applicable 
than the concept of the precautionary principle.   
 
While considering safety-critical and life-saving systems for an asset life extension project, it is 
important to critically review the past operating history, maintenance regimes, modifications to 
the original system design, equipment failures and/or modifications, obsolescence, and changes to 
regulatory requirements and industry best practice. Typical systems to be reviewed under an asset 
life extension program, with respect to safety systems, include but are not limited to: 
 
6.2.1 Firewater Systems 
It is imperative that firewater and deluge systems of offshore facilities are thoroughly reviewed to 
determine the current system status and identify the potential risk of increasing the service life. 
Any modifications to the original system design should be reviewed, monitored, and analyzed. 
Deluge testing results should be trended to aid in the understanding and analysis of the system 
operations. A thorough review of past fire pump maintenance, failures, and performance must be 
determined. Historical firewater pump output and pressure, as well as the pressure at the ring 
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main(s) and individual deluge skids/valves should be reviewed to ensure they are within the design 
range. Any known additional future firewater requirements should also be considered in the 
assessment. Firewater piping corrosion reports must be reviewed to determine if repairs or 
replacements are required. Concerning firewater piping, corrosion under insulation should be 
considered. Original equipment manufacturers for major pieces of equipment should be contacted 
to determine if there any issues with equipment obsolescence for the perceived duration of the 
proposed life extension.  
 
As the firewater system review is a multi-disciple engineering review, engineering judgment 
following systematic analysis must be utilized to determine the feasibility of extending the system 
service life. All potential risks of extending the service life must be identified such that mitigating 
measures may be put in place to ensure the system risk of failure is ALARP.  
 
6.2.2 Foam Systems 
In addition to the sentiments highlighted above under the firewater system review, there are 
increased requirements for foam systems to comply with changes to environmental practices. The 
industry is moving into more environmentally friendly foams, moving from a C8 to C6 
fluorochemistry firefighting foam. Synthetic firefighting foams, including aqueous film-forming 
foam (AFFF), alcohol-resistant aqueous film-forming foam (AR-AFFF), and film-forming 
fluoroprotein foam (FFFP), utilize perfluorinated surfactants and low molecular weight polymers 
in their manufacturing. Perfluorinated surfactants contained in firefighting foams have almost 
exclusively been produced by the telomerization process, with these surfactants containing carbon 
chains ranging from C4 to C24 in length. It has been found that higher carbon changes (C8 and 
above) can break down in the environment to produce perfluoroctanoic acid (PFOA) or other 
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perfluorocarboxylic acids (PFCAs) while shorter chain compounds have a lower potential for 
toxicity and bioaccumulation. (Tyco, 2016) 
 
The foam manufacturing industry has moved from the production of C8 foam to C6 foam. For 
facilities that have not yet fully transitioned their firefighting foam systems to a C6 formation, they 
would be required to do so for asset life extension.  
 
6.2.3 Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Systems 
The primary objectives of PFP systems for offshore facilities, in general, are to prevent the 
weakening and collapse of primary, load-bearing, structural steel; to maintain the integrity and 
viability of the temporary refuge, escape routes, and evacuation systems; and to protect critical 
components and essential equipment/systems.  
 
Fire-resistant coatings and coverings, fire/blast rated bulkheads, partitions and doors, and fire and 
blast rated pipe penetrations and cable transit seals typically form the basis of a passive fire 
protection system aboard an offshore installation.  
 
Passive Fire Protection systems are susceptible to “physical aging” as opposed to “reliability-
based” aging concepts. Physical aging corresponds to a slow, continuous process of degradation 
of the equipment properties and functions. (Health and Safety Executive, 2007). There are 
differing anomaly or failure types for PFP coating systems. The HSE provides guidance on the 
various anomalies: 
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Surface Cracking and Spalling – This can be a result of incorrect application, exposure to 
extreme weather and operating conditions, or general wear over time. Intumescent coatings 
generally have low ductility levels; when applied to vessels or surfaces that expand and contract 
with temperature, particularly on heated vessels, cracking tends to occur.  
 
Water Ingress and Corrosion – This is generally due to a breakdown of the topcoat, deep 
cracking, and disbandment. If left over time, excessive corrosion under insulation will occur.  
 
Disbondment – With disbondment, separation can either be between the PFP system layers or at 
the interface between the PFP and the protected surface. The coating is bonded to the steel substrate 
by adhesive force but the primary retention is provided by mesh, a physical retention mechanism.  
If the material loses its adhesion with the substrate the mesh allows the coating to maintain its fire 
protection capability. However, the corrosion rate of the steel mesh and support pins will accelerate 
if there is excessive moisture within the coating.  
 
Chips and Gouges – This usually occurs due to physical exposures and contacts with sharp, 
abrasive objects. 
 
Erosion – Typically, these occur at weather-exposed surfaces and at the extremities, for example, 
where wind speeds are high and harsh weather is common. (Health and Safety Executive, 2007) 
 
6.2.4 Life-Saving Appliances and Rescue Equipment 
In terms of an asset life extension review, life-saving appliances and rescue equipment generally 
refer to items such as lifeboats, davit systems, life raft systems, fixed escape systems, and fast 
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rescue craft where a facility is outfitted with such. For items that may be easily replaced, such as 
throw-over life rafts, there is an existing predetermined service life and as such an assessment 
would not be required.  
 
Lifeboats and fast rescue craft can have a service life that would exceed that of a facility if the 
equipment has been properly maintained and the equipment is not obsolete such that spare parts 
will remain available for the foreseeable future. With respect to survival craft, known issues with 
a particular model type or a manufacturer that is no longer supporting the equipment could 
necessitate a full replacement. 
 
The goal of the system review is to determine the service life of the system and identify the changes 
and/or modifications that may be required to increase the useful life of the system to facilities 
updated end of life. In some cases, the service life may not be able to be extended, and a full system 
overhaul and/or change out may be required. Conversely, it may be found that the system is in 
excellent working order, with a verified service life past exceeding the facility end of life, and no 
modifications are required.  
 
While offshore oil and gas asset life extension projects have been undertaken in other areas for 
some time, the concept has only recently been required locally for the offshore Newfoundland and 
Labrador facilities. It is of my opinion that the concept of ALARP ties more appropriately into an 
ALE project than that of the concept of the Precautionary Principle. But perhaps there should be 
learnings taken from both; Risk assessing the criticality of a suggested upgrade (as opposed to a 
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do-nothing approach) can aid in the decision-making process on the future reliability, survivability, 
and availability of individual pieces of equipment or safety systems as a whole.  
 
As we saw in 2020, unique challenges are facing the offshore oil and gas industry. A global 
pandemic has threatened many local oil and gas projects, and of noteworthy concern the asset life 
extension of the Terra Nova FPSO. While a global pandemic is an unexpected setback and one 
that would not be qualified within any risk assessment, perhaps one may hypothesize, at least with 
respect to timing, if perhaps PP could have been applied. There are always unknowns and novelties 
as we undertake a new process within a geographical region. While it is still my opinion that 
decisions, with respect to the extension for safety systems, should be made based on the principle 
of ALARP, if and when there is uncertainty, one should take precaution to ensure the owner has 












7 C-NLOPB Current Regulatory Regime and Upcoming Regulatory Changes 
As previously stated, the C-NLOPB regulates local offshore installations through a suite of 
existing regulations and guidelines. These regulations and guidelines have been issued and 
modified based on the authority derived from Canada‐Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic 
Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act. C-NLOPB regulations have been 
continuously evolving, with new regulations being added, since they first were established 
beginning in the late 1980s.  
 
The current regulatory regime is somewhat prescriptive in that, for the large part, they dictate how 
an Operator is to achieve regulatory compliance. Changes are coming to the regulatory framework 
to transition from a prescriptive based regulatory regimen to a hybrid approach where goal-based 
regulations are preferred.  
 
7.1 Frontier and Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative 
The Frontier and Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative (FORRI) is a federal/provincial 
government partnership initiative focusing on regulations in all offshore administrative areas in 
Canada. FORRI was created through the Atlantic Roundtable initiative in 2005. (McNeil, 2019) 
 
It is the intent of FORRI to modernize the regulatory framework not only to performance-based 
requirements but also to reduce redundancy across multiple regulations, bring standards up to date, 
and enable a more efficient and effective regulatory regime. In the development of performance-
based requirements, the focus will be more on the regulatory goal rather than the means. This will 
allow the regulations to have more flexibility to incorporate changing practices, standards, and 
technology. 
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The current regulatory process has an overwhelming regime with respect to seeking approval for 
regulatory alternatives outside the current regulations' prescriptive requirements. FORRI intends 
to streamline the process and reduce the need for regulatory approval on the means of achieving a 
regulatory requirement/goal, thus reducing the administrative burden on the industry.  
 
FORRI intends to eliminate five existing regulations and integrate them into one new framework 
regulation. These five regulations are:  
• Operations Regulations 
• Installation Regulations 
• Drilling and Production Regulations  
• Geophysical Regulations 
• Certificate of Fitness Regulations (Government of Canada, 2020) 
 
There are five major stages to regulatory development in Canada:  
• Developing policy intent to inform the drafting of the regulations  
• Drafting regulations  
• Pre-publication in Canada Gazette I  
• Public comment period on draft regulations  
• Publication in Canada Gazette II (Government of Canada, 2020) 
 
The publication of the FORRI into the Canada Gazette has been delayed and the pre-publishing of 
draft regulations into Part I of the Canada Gazette awaits, at which point, the public has an 
opportunity to comment on the draft regulations. Prior to coming into force, the final regulations 
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will be published in Part II of the Canada Gazette. It is anticipated that draft regulations will be 
entered into Part I of the Canada Gazette sometime in 2021.  
 
With the transition to FORRI, the applicable regulatory boards, i.e., C-NLOPB, will issue new 
guidelines to be utilized in conjunction with the new regulations. The guidelines will not be 
mandates but will aid in ensuring compliance. While the concept of the Certificate of Fitness will 
remain the same, with the implementation of the FORRI regulations, a certification plan will now 
be required. As the FORRI regulations are intended to move away from prescriptive requirements, 
including the standards a facility must meet, a certification plan will be required to outline the 
codes and standards a facility is designed against to meet the regulatory intent. This effectively 
implements the ALARP principle into the new regulatory framework as the planned measures each 
Operator will implement to meet regulatory compliance must be demonstrated. (McNeil, 2019) 
 
In addition to the development of the Framework Regulations, the Atlantic Occupational Health 
and Safety Initiative is also working to revise and modernize the occupational health and safety 
regulations to enhance safety and environmental protection. (Government of Canada, 2020) 
 
The proposed policy intention for the Framework Regulations is available for review. While not 
yet in force, early review of the regulatory updates is of paramount importance as differing 
regulatory requirements from the existing regime can have a great effect on offshore operations 
and future design.  
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The current policy intention for the Phase 1 of Framework Regulations contains the following 
sections:  
Part 1 – Board Powers 
Part 2 – Management System 
Part 3 – Application for Authorizations and Approvals 
Part 4 – Operator Duties (Government of Canada, 2016) 
 
The current policy intention for the Phase 2 of Framework Regulations contains the following 
sections:  
Part 10 – Evaluation of Wells, Pools and Fields 
Part 11 – Measurements 
Part 12 – Production Conservation 
Part 13 – Terminations and Decommissioning  
Part 14 – Submissions, Notifications , Records and Reports (Government of Canada, 2016) 
 
The current policy intention for the Phase 3 of Framework Regulations contains the following 
sections:  
 
Part 5 – Certificate of Fitness 
Part 6 – Installation Analysis, Design, Construction and Maintenance  
Part 7 – Systems and Equipment Design, Operation and Maintenance 
Part 8 -  Geoscience, Geotechnical and Environmental Operations  
Part 9 – Support Operations (Government of Canada, 2017) 
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Phase 3 FORRI proposed requirements, Part 6, Installation Analysis, Design, Construction and 
Maintenance and Part 7, System and Equipment Design, Operation and Maintenance, were 
reviewed against the current C-NLOPB regulations noted below: 
SOR/95-104 Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installations Regulation  (C-NLOPB, 2020) 
SOR/2009-316 Canada Oil and Gas Drilling and Production Regulations (C-NLOPB, 2014) 
 
The following items noted are some of the more substantial differences with respect to Technical 
Safety design. The below items are not intended to be an exhaustive listing and aim to highlight 
some of the more prudent changes that affected the discipline of Safety and Risk. 
 
7.1.1 FORRI Gap Assessment 
7.1.1.1 FORRI 6.6 Fire, Explosion and Hazardous Gas Risk Assessment 
FORRI 6.6 states, “the operator shall ensure that a methodical and comprehensive fire and 
explosion risk assessment, as well as a hazardous gas containment and risk assessment are carried 
out for every installation” (Government of Canada; Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; 
Government of Nova Scotia, 2019) however the current C-NLOPB regulations do not require such 
an assessment for the accommodations and/or Temporary Refuge. The proposed requirement 
displays the shift from a prescriptive design to a more goal-based design, echoing the requirements 
of the UK.  
 
7.1.1.2 FORRI 6.7 Passive Fire and Blast Protection 
FORRI 6.7 states that “The operator shall ensure that every installation is equipped with sufficient 
passive fire and blast protection and barriers…”. Furthermore, it states a prescriptive requirement 
for H-120 fire-rated division for “external bulkheads of the Temporary Safe Refuge, 
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accommodations, evacuation embarkation points excluding helidecks, and control rooms that are 
facing production or well heads; and the bulkheads that segregate the well head and production 
process areas from other areas of the installation.” These prescriptive H-120 requirements are not 
a part of the current set of C-NLOPB regulations.  
 
Additionally, the proposed FORRI regulations also require that all installations, at a minimum, 
meet the fire and blast requirements of a classification society regardless if it is intended to be a 
classed facility. Linkages to class society is a new requirement and not currently applicable under 
the C-NLOPB regulations; however, these requirements are often met in practice. (Government of 
Canada; Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019).  
 
7.1.1.3 FORRI 6.8 Prevention and Mitigation of Major Accidents  
A regulatory clause specific to the prevention and mitigation of major accidents is a new 
requirement that is not explicitly stated in the current C-NLOPB regulations.  It states: 
 
The operator shall ensure that the reliability and availability of every system, the failure 
of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident event or the purpose 
of which is to prevent or limit the effects of a major accident event, is demonstrated through 
formal and appropriate risk and reliability analysis techniques to identify required 
redundancies and measures to protect that system from failure. (Government of Canada; 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019). 
 
This clause points to a stricter requirement around the identification and design of Safety Critical 
Elements (SCE) as well as the generation of applicable Performance Standards (PS) that are 
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referred to in the C-NLOPB Drilling and Production Guidelines. This somewhat new requirement 
for FORRI emphasizes the movement towards a goal-based regulatory process and the importance 
placed on the use of SCEs and PSs.  
 
7.1.1.4 FORRI 6.19 Classification and Access to Hazardous Locations  
FORRI 6.19 states: 
(1) The operator shall ensure that every platform is divided into different hazardous areas 
according to the type of activities that will be carried out and according to the associated 
hazards; and that higher risk areas are segregated from lower risk areas, and from areas 
containing important safety functions.  
 
(2) The operator shall ensure that hazard identification and risk assessments are carried 
out for each area to identify hazardous areas in which an explosive atmosphere may occur.  
…. (Government of Canada; Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; 
Government of Nova Scotia, 2019). 
 
The requirements of this section of FORRI are largely covered under Section 9 Access to 
Hazardous Areas of the SOR/95-104. However, FORRI has more emphasis on specific hazard 
identification and risk assessments.  Again, moving away from our current regulatory regime's 
prescriptive requirements and moving into more goal-based requirements based on site-specific 





7.1.1.5 FORRI 7.30 Fire, Gas Detection 
FORRI within this section requires: 
The operator shall ensure that every fire and gas detection system is designed, arranged, 
including location, number, and types of detectors, tested and maintained such that:  
a. they are based on the Fire, Explosion and Hazardous Gas Risk Assessment in 6.6 and 
that they will ensure that any such fire, explosive or toxic gas accumulation, or other 
foreseeable abnormal conditions related to hazards identified in the Assessment will be 
detected;  
…  
j. means to manually initiate fire and gas alarm shall be available at or near the office of 
the manager of the installation, at the control center, at every control station and other 
defined locations throughout the facility identified in the Fire, Explosion and Hazardous 
Gas Risk Assessment required under 6.6; (Government of Canada; Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019) 
 
As stated previously, the Fire, Explosion and Hazardous Gas Risk Assessment is a new scope for 
the accommodations area/Temporary Refuge. Additionally, defining “other” areas to manually 
initiate fire and gas alarms based on a fire and gas assessment would likely require an assessment 
in greater detail than what has been completed in the past. The emphasis on design and installation 
in accordance with the required Fire, Explosion and Hazardous Gas Risk Assessment differs from 
the current C-NLOPB regulations, which require fire and gas detection devices to be designed, 
installed and maintained in accordance with prescriptive requirements such as design to National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 72 and American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practices 
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14C and 14F. (Government of Canada; Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government 
of Nova Scotia, 2019) (C-NLOPB, 2020) 
 
7.1.1.6 FORRI 7.31 Ignition Prevention  
Ignition prevention is a new section listed within FORRI, and it encompasses portions of various 
sections of the current C-NLOPB regulations. FORRI, Section 7.31 states:  
1) The operator shall ensure that materials and equipment on an installation are arranged, 
at all times, to prevent ignition of combustible and explosive fluids, and that measures are 
taken:  
a. to prevent fire and explosion, including measures to prevent uncontrolled release or 
accumulation of combustible or explosive substances; and  
b. to prevent the ignition of such substances and atmospheres.  
 
(2) All mechanical and electrical equipment located in a hazardous area identified in 
accordance with 6.19(2) shall be suitably designed, rated, protected, ventilated and 
maintained for safe operation in their intended location.  
 
(3) All equipment that is not suitably rated for use in a hazardous area shall be operated 
only at a safe distance from any potential source of combustible or explosive fluids and 
shall be equipped with automatic and manual means of deactivation in the event of gas 
detection (deactivation includes shut off and de-energize).  
 
(4) Any equipment that is to remain active in the event of an emergency associated with 
gas release is to be suitably rated for operation as if it was located in a hazardous area.  
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(5) The operator shall ensure that hot work is only carried out under a permit to work 
system that has pre-determined safe distances from wells and other sources of ignitable 
and explosive fluids and other risk mitigation measures identified through risk analysis to 
prevent ignition.  
(6) The operator shall ensure that the requirements in this section are supported by 
comprehensive risk assessments specific to the installation.  
 
(7) The operator shall ensure that cargo tank internal atmospheres are maintained outside 
the explosive limits and that such systems will be designed, equipped with sufficient 
barriers, alarms and redundancy to:  
a. prevent risks to safety during all modes of cargo operations; and  
b. ensure that personnel are made aware when such systems become impaired. 
(Government of Canada; Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of 
Nova Scotia, 2019)  
  
Like other portions of FORRI, this section is now more goal and compliance-based, putting more 
design priority on the use of risk assessment and reviews.  
 
7.1.1.7 FORRI 7.32 Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown  
This FORRI section is relatable to Section 18, Emergency Shutdown System, of the C-NLOPB 
Installation Regulations; however, it has been revised to include a more goal and compliance-
based approach. It states that “The operator shall ensure that the emergency shutdown system 
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design shall be based on a formal risk assessment and analysis.” (Government of Canada; 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019)  
 
Within this section of the proposed regulations, there are new requirements not currently present 
in the C-NLOPB regulations, such as specifying that cold venting cannot be included in the 
emergency depressurization and disposal of hydrocarbon inventory. Furthermore, it specifies that 
temporary equipment on an installation shall be integrated into the installation emergency 
shutdown system and adhere to the system logic. 
 
7.1.1.8 FORRI 7.33 Fire Protection Systems and Equipment  
The portion of FORRI relates to the requirement of ensuring that “all safe and reasonable measures 
are taken at every installation and operations site to control and extinguish or control fires as 
appropriate and to minimize any danger to safety or the environment that results or may be 
reasonably expected to result from the fire.”  
 
Again, this section relies heavily on installation-specific hazard assessments rather than the 
prescriptive requirements of C-NLOPB SOR-95-104, which notes various standards to which a 
fire protection system must comply. FORRI states, “The design and selection of fire protection 
systems and equipment, including suppression agents is appropriate for its intended use based on 
the Fire, Explosion and Hazardous Gas Risk Assessment required in 6.6.” (Government of Canada; 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019)  
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FORRI section 7.33 (9) states that the “firewater system must be able to run continuously for a 
minimum of 18 hours”, this is a relaxed requirement from C-NLOPB SOR-95-104, which requires 
a period of 24 hours.  
 
Additionally, prescriptive requirements surrounding the design of fire hydrant systems, Section 24 
C-NLOPB SOR-95-104, are not present in the proposed FORRI requirements. It allows more room 
for engineering design and best practice and only states, “The number and position of the hydrants 
and/or fire hose reels shall be such that at least two jets of water, not emanating from the same 
location, may reach any part of the installation normally accessible. For areas where the use of 
hydrants and hose reels is impracticable portable fire extinguishing equipment may be provided.” 
 
7.1.1.9 FORRI 7.36 Evacuation and Escape 
This portion of the proposed FORRI regulations intents to “ensure that every installation has the 
most suitable and most effective facilities and technology practicable for safe and controlled 
emergency response during accidental events.” (Government of Canada; Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019) This section is more robust with 
respect to requirements of the design of the Temporary Refuge and provides more guidance in 
comparison to the current C-NLOPB regulations. The FORRI requirements are more goal-based, 
where the onus is on the operator to demonstrate temporary refuge, and evacuation systems are 
sufficiently designed against the installation-specific hazards and allow for safe evacuation based 





7.1.1.10 FORRI 7.37 Lifesaving Equipment for Offshore Installations  
The section of FORRI details the requirements of the Operator to “ensure every offshore 
installation is designed for and equipped with sufficient lifesaving equipment, survival craft and 
launching facilities safe evacuation of all personnel.” (Government of Canada; Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019) 
 
FORRI Section 7.37 is similar in nature to Section 22, Lifesaving Equipment for Installations, of 
C-NLOPB Petroleum Installations regulations. However, there are new explicit requirements in 
FORRI regarding the number and locations of evacuation stations. It states: 
 
(3) The operator shall ensure that the arrangement and selection of the lifeboats is based 
on a formal Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis that considers all of the major 
accidental events evaluated in the Quantitative Risk Analysis and that:  
a. each installation arrange for lifeboats in at least two separate locations; and, ensure 
that those locations, based on the installation’s safety studies, 
including the escape and evacuation analysis, provide the optimal redundancy for 
evacuation from the installation for all foreseeable emergency scenarios; 
b. such lifeboats (and associated equipment such as launching mechanism) shall include 
features to maximize escape [from the installation]; 
c. at least one location is adjacent to the temporary safe refuge; and 
d. provides sufficient capacity to accommodate the total number of persons on board if a 
lifeboat in any one location is lost or rendered unusable. (Government of Canada; 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador; Government of Nova Scotia, 2019) 
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There is a clear shift in the proposed FORRI framework regulations whereby the expectation is 
safety and risk-based decisions are to be formulated based on facility-specific safety-related 
studies and the established QRA.  
 
7.1.2 FORRI Effects 
As highlighted in the previous sections, the proposed regulatory updates represent a global shift 
from the current prescriptive requirements to more performance-based requirements. With respect 
to regulatory compliance, Operators will now be required to develop and submit a certification 
plan highlighting how an Operator meets, or intends to meet, a regulatory initiative rather than 
completing a regulatory compliance matrix.  
 
This shift gives the Operator more flexibility on how they meet, or intend to meet regulation, and  













Newfoundland and Labrador has a long standing history in the oil and gas sector. Throughout the 
last 40 years, the local industry has seen many changes; new discoveries, new facilities, and new 
opportunities. Along with the successes, there have been accidents and tragedies. However, 
emerging from these accidents, the industry moved toward a more safety prominent culture with 
increased regulations and stronger risk management.  The industry continues to grow and evolve, 
some of the existing facilities are aging and coming upon the end of their original design life. With 
aging, new hazards may immerge or old hazards may be modified. It is necessary to analyze risks 
as changes immerge throughout a facility’s lifecycle to ensure risks remain tolerable and ALARP.  
Newfoundland’s oil and gas regulatory regime is in the process of renewal and revitalization 
through the Frontier and Offshore Regulatory Renewal Initiative. It is the intention that the 
regulatory framework is to transition from a prescriptive based regulatory regimen to a hybrid 
approach with goal-based regulations. As FORRI allows for more freedom on how operators are 
to comply with the regulatory intent, it places strong emphasis on site specific hazard identification 











This body of work, in its current state, can aid in the risk management practices of oil and gas 
operators. This thesis can also serve as an aid in the review of safety systems associated with 
facilities undergoing asset life extension. Additionally, with respect to upcoming regulatory 
renewal initiatives the identified gaps highlighted under Chapter 7 may allow operators an advance 
indication of potential impact on safety system design. 
 
For future improvement of this work, it is recommended that the following items are expanded 
upon: 
• With every MAE there are learnings and systemic factors which can be strengthened. The 
aftermath of some MAEs have a global impact, such as those highlighted in this thesis. 
Additional MAEs could be researched and analyzed to determine the associated lessons 
learned to highlight potential risk reduction techniques to be employed in future works.  
• If appropriate data could be obtained, the completion of a case study would be beneficial 
in demonstrating the potential risks associated with asset life extension. Furthermore, 
mitigating measures could be identified to reduce the risks to ALARP. 
• To further demonstrate the potential of technical safety and risk impacts of the regulatory 
changes associated with FORRI, a case study could be conducted. It should be noted that 
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